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Abstract—Self-engineering systems that are capable of repair- 
ing themselves in-situ without the need for human decision (or 
intervention) could be used to achieve zero-maintenance. This 
philosophy is synonymous to the way in which the human body 
heals and repairs itself up to a point. This article synthesises 
issues related to an emerging area of self-healing technologies that 
links software and hardware mitigations strategies. Efforts are 
concentrated on built-in detection, masking and active mitigation 
that comprises self-recovery  or  self-repair  capability,  and has 
a focus on system resilience and recovering from fault events. 
Design techniques are critically reviewed to clarify the role of 
fault coverage, resource allocation and fault awareness, set in the 
context of existing and emerging printable/nanoscale manufac- 
turing processes. The analysis presents new opportunities to form 
a view on the research required for a successful integration of 
zero-maintenance. Finally, the potential cost benefits and future 
trends are enumerated. 
Index Terms—Fault-tolerance, self-repair, zero-maintenance, 
built-in fault detection, self-healing systems 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rising maintenance costs facing today’s high value 
manufacturing industry is fuelling a new appetite for design 
strategies that reduce maintenance, repair and overhaul costs 
of complex high value systems [1]. The availability and 
dependability of electronic components and sub-components 
within complex, high-value systems is a critical driver for 
reducing the net cost per hour of operation. Fault events and 
associated system error states incur punitive costs due to; fault 
location and diagnosis; invasive inspection and test; provision 
for frequent maintenance intervals even if fault events have not 
occurred. Electronic systems and sub-systems have therefore 
become a pivotal element in fault-sensitive, service-driven 
sectors. 
This article surveys several journal articles, conference 
papers, books and literature reviews on hardware approaches 
that are anticipated to pave the way towards zero-maintenance 
capabilities. Such capabilities are difficult (or even impossible) 
to implement exclusively within  the  software,  mechanical  
or materials domains: instead the majority of strategies are 
partially (or fully) coupled with electronic systems and sub- 
systems since this permits a wide range of fault mitigation 
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approaches. Hence cross-domain strategies feature heavily in 
the methods considered. The aim of this work is therefore     
to develop a core understanding of zero-maintenance within 
electronic systems and related design strategies for its imple- 
mentation. This is achieved through a number of objectives 
outlined below: 
 
• Analyse current trends in the evolution of self-recovery 
and self-repair towards achieving zero-maintenance; 
• Present a quantitative (and where possible qualitative) 
comprehension of the design trade-off factors and met- 
rics; 
• Develop a cohesive understanding of zero-maintenance 
as a design approach and technology in its own right; 
• Develop an appreciation of the core merits of zero- 
maintenance through a sector-wise view of the technol- 
ogy. 
 
The title of this article has been chosen carefully, because the 
use of the word perspectives implies a personal analysis and 
presentation on behalf of the authors. The authors’ expertise 
range in the areas of diagnostic design, signal processing, 
maintenance, self-healing and machine learning; with signifi- 
cant focus on practical implementation rather than theoretical. 
Nevertheless, the article’s contents will be of general interest 
to electrical scientists and engineers, because some of the 
more practical issues of implementing self-recovery and self- 
repair capabilities are often not appreciated, let alone the costs 
attached to them. The focus is  therefore  towards  detailing 
the philosophy of having zero-maintenance. The principal 
concepts of self-detection, fault masking/mitigation behaviour 
monitoring are analysed and categorised according to their 
design level implementations. Self-recovery in the presence of 
faults is an important step towards realising complex systems 
capable of maintaining their designed for function throughout 
their intended life-cycle. The other characteristic is that their 
common design metrics must be analysed in terms of fault 
coverage, resource allocation/cost and fault awareness set in 
the context of existing and emerging electronic manufacturing 
processes. To the best of  the  authors’  knowledge,  this  is  
the first study which provides a detailed account on zero- 
maintenance systems and related system approaches. These 
accounts have been broken down into research questions, that 
are suggested together with their motivations in Table I. The 
questions are aimed to make some semantic distinctions which 
are important towards application. These can be divided in 
terms of approach (active or passive), methodologies, tech- 
niques, applications, implementation requirements and capa- 
bilities, cost implications and their impact. 
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accomplish a task 
TABLE 1 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Research question Table(s) Motivation 
 
What are the technological requirements for zero-maintenance? VI, XI, XII 
Identify the types of implementation tools that can be used to 
What approaches can be considered to achieve these capabilities? XIV, XV Identify the types of active and passive approaches 
What kind of design methodologies can be used for 
zero-maintenance? XIII, XVI Identify how to systematically solve the problem 
What techniques can be used to provide built-in fault detection? III Identify the type of techniques or tests that can be used 
What metrics can be used to estimate the cost implications? VIII Identify the most important key performance metrics 
What are the challenges for a zero-maintenance philosophy on 
mission-critical and resilience systems? 
What kind of applications can benefit from its successful 
realisation? 
XVI Identify opportunities for self management systems 
XVII Categorise the applications where it can be used 
 
 
A. Contributions 
The article focuses on an emerging and important topic 
across many complex engineering industries. It provides a 
broad overview of self healing and self repair techniques, 
which span multiple application domains. For each technique, 
the authors provide its basic form and then consider how it 
can be useful to achieve zero-maintenance. Literature devel- 
opments are discussed accordingly. This  template  provides 
an easier and succinct understanding of these techniques, 
taking note of their applicability and limitations. Whilst most 
of the work covered focuses on the  electronics  industry,  
there is an increase interest from electro-mechanical domain. 
The authors have noted that zero-maintenance systems need  
to attain the characteristics of self-diagnosis, self-repair and 
self-immobilisation to some degree, to prevent more serious 
damage and catastrophic breakdowns. As research within this 
area is of practical importance, some older references have 
been included, e.g., early discussions about online self-test 
and repair, which never really took hold after electronics 
became repairable during manufacture and relatively robust 
in-service. This is not necessarily true of emerging non- 
CMOS technologies and so the online repair theme is popular 
once more. To accomplish the study aims and objectives, this 
research undertook a filtering process where the key main 
themes and subtopics (formalisms, design and strategies for 
zero-maintenance of electronic systems) were decided upon, 
and selected journals and conferences formed the bulk of 
material for review and analysis. These range from electronics, 
maintenance and repair, manufacture and more, all of which 
are directly related to self-recovery, self-repair and its mainte- 
nance application. To summarise the key contributions at the 
outset, the article provides: 
• An organised and critical view of current and emerging 
trends towards achieving zero-maintenance; 
• A state-of-the-art on common design techniques in terms 
of fault coverage, resource allocation/cost and fault 
awareness set in the context of existing and emerging 
electronic manufacturing processes; 
• A discussion of the key performance metrics and their 
relevance within different application domains. This in- 
cludes past methods that have seen renewed interest such 
as fine-grained device/interconnect redundancy; 
• An overview of the potential impact upon mission- 
 
critical, high resilience systems whose useful lifespan 
depends on efficient, self-management of spare resources. 
There seems to be an over-emphasis on being able to 
deploy high-level models rapidly, without the need of   
an underlying technical expertise about the processing 
framework; 
• Consideration is given to the relative effort needed for the 
successful integration of a zero-maintenance philosophy 
weighed against cost factors. 
Also, the authors have written this article in a way,  that   
can allow readers with a non-electronic background to gain an 
understanding of the zero-maintenance philosophy. The article 
first follows the trends towards zero-maintenance and dis- 
cusses the challenges for its successful realisation in Section II. 
In Section III, a brief perspective on the quantification of zero- 
maintenance parameters is formed. Expanding upon this we 
delve into more detail on how this approach can be introduced 
into electronic systems, providing state of the art examples in 
Section IV. It also outlines recent approaches for quantifying 
the success and trade offs of these techniques using current 
metrics. The discussion then switches to focus upon design 
with an overview of the main active and passive methods for 
mitigating faults in electronic systems in Section V, before a 
look at how a number of design strategies can be undertaken to 
incorporate these techniques across a number of applications 
in Sections VI. Finally the paper looks forward, drawing 
conclusions about this emerging field, with an outlook on the 
opportunities and challenges that await. 
 
II. TOWARDS ZERO-MAINTENANCE 
Can a system’s maintenance effort be reduced to zero? 
Perhaps a more realistic question is: can a system operate as 
originally intended, all the time? 
If a system (or service or component) operates without 
failing, and delivers the exact business function without any 
manual intervention, then there is some semblance of mov- 
ing towards zero-maintenance. Even though  this  may  only 
be a theoretical possibility, it provides a perspective to ex- 
plore questions for bridging a knowledge gap. An ideal self- 
engineering system should be capable of repairing itself in-situ 
without the need for human decision (or intervention). This 
will have a significant impact on reducing the overall cost of 
the maintenance process [2]. However, the application of this 
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philosophy within engineering is a challenge and the authors 
aim to draw attention to the need for maintenance systems to 
have self-diagnosis and self-repair capabilities, built-in logic 
for self-reconfiguration and a cost weighted solution. 
The concept embodies the idea of enabling applications and 
systems to achieve and sustain near-zero spend, and transform 
the traditional maintenance practices from ‘Fail-and-Fix’ to 
‘Predict-and-Prevent’ and ultimately to a ‘Fail-Proof’ state. A 
classification of literature is presented in Table II with a direct 
link between the topic of interest and the concepts discussed 
and analysed within. These articles highlight that concepts 
such as self-healing and self-repair are predominantly designed 
at the component and material science level. Within all these 
applications, there are generic concepts of zero-maintenance. 
However, for safety-critical applications, such as aerospace or 
nuclear that operate in inaccessible environments (e.g. space, 
offshore), there is a need to have a system level of self- 
diagnosis and self-repair, if not self-immobilisation, to prevent 
more serious damage and catastrophic breakdowns. 
In the broadest sense, Reliability, Availability and Service- 
ability (RAS) performance metrics become highly dependent 
upon self-repair capability. Further downstream impact can  
be seen within integrated health monitoring, online self-test 
within which interrupt-free service is a critical profit margin 
driver [17], [18], [19]. As a result of this, growing interest   
has emerged for new design strategies with zero-maintenance 
properties. This article will focus on electronic components 
and sub-systems that are equipped with new fault detection 
and classification capabilities [20], [21]. Existing capabilities 
that can relate to these concepts are briefly introduced  in 
Table  III. Maintenance can be related to this emerging area   
of self-healing technologies as it links software and hardware 
mitigations strategies across multiple domains where many 
failure classes exist [22], [23]. Examples relating to elec- 
tronic systems include mechatronics [24], control [25] and 
materials. In some cases an overlap exists between hardware 
and software domains occurs for example, in fault-tolerant 
GPU algorithms [26], VHDL methods for redundant layout   
in FPGAs [27] and FPGA bitstream manipulation [8] and 
therefore zero-maintenance is driven by a subset of failure 
classes. In addition to this, mitigation relies upon an aware- 
ness of the underlying hardware, especially multiple multi- 
processor, custom configurable architectures and reliability- 
driven compilation [7]. This survey therefore focuses on key 
emerging trends for hardware-driven mitigation methods that 
relate to Table III. 
 
A. Technology platforms 
The philosophy of zero-maintenance is relatable to several 
existing and emerging electronic technologies. State-of-the- 
art hardware fault mitigation techniques handle permanent 
faults using active detect-respond mitigation, whilst sometimes 
operating along side passive masking. FPGAs are frequently 
used for studies in this area [6] where online  reconfigu-  
ration remains a highly challenging task [12], [28], [29].  
More sophisticated reconfigurable platforms are emerging that 
support development of dynamic self-test and repair (STAR). 
Manufacturing yield enhancement has been a strong driver for 
significant investment for silicon electronics and the resulting 
yield-driven strategies continue to extract fully functional oper- 
ation out of essentially error-prone fabrication processes [30]. 
These strategies are undergoing a transformation to include 
built in repair mechanisms that operate beyond the point of 
manufacture. Emerging non-silicone technologies of relevance 
to zero-maintenance are printable large area and nanoscale 
electronics that bring new challenges and opportunities for 
fault mitigation due to their differing fabrication processes and 
technology scaling. 
In respect to hardware development platforms, a key goal  
of future zero-maintenance strategies is to proliferate fault 
detection and discrimination towards the lower design levels 
in order that detection occurs closer to the actual fault locale. 
This aspect is explored further in Section IV-A. It is further 
expected that fault mitigation operates most effectively when 
concentrated as far as possible to the same locale. To support 
development of such fine-grained fault mitigation, hardware in 
loop monitoring has advanced significantly in recent years to 
support industrial control and monitoring platforms for high- 
value sectors such as aerospace, mining, consumer transporta- 
tion and exploration where even small down-time events incur 
considerable financial cost. In such cases the incorporation   
of built-in actions that inhibit further fault events become 
extremely valuable as does the ability to record the frequency 
and nature of abnormal events. 
 
B. Implementation challenges 
A precursor to eliminating effort required to maintain any 
function, is to monitor it. Under nominal operational con- 
ditions, dependability in electronic systems is secured when 
errors arising from faults can be diagnosed. Therefore fault 
detection and mitigation during normal operation becomes 
paramount. Faults stem from a number of sources, including 
production defects (infant mortality), ground level radiation 
effects, yield challenges for next generation fabrication pro- 
cesses, greatly increasing complexity of mission and safety 
critical electronic systems, testability of complex systems, 
highly integrated System in Package (SiP) ageing factors 
especially for high power devices and ultra low voltage ASICs. 
Within this survey, it is therefore assumed that the primary 
faults under consideration relate to transient upsets or perma- 
nent faults in each of these cases1. Therefore, several factors 
make achieving zero-maintenance a challenging endeavor: 
1) Provisioning for various fault types: Commonly encoun- 
tered faults and errors (potentially) arising within electronics 
are considered in Table IV. Such events may occur on a time-
limited basis and maybe short-lived, repetitive (persis- tent) or 
periodic in nature. Upsets can cause temporary or permanent 
fault conditions, but errors do not necessarily result. Faults that 
do not cause immediate errors are termed sub- critical and 
may lie dormant between power cycles or remain indefinitely. 
Their influence upon error state is dependent upon the system 
state, and therefore sub-critical faults are 
1A broad discussion of such matters is found in [31], in which various 
examples of fault and error manifestation are discussed. 
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TABLE 2 
CATEGORISATION OF REVIEW LITERATURE RELATING TO ZERO-MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Topic Article 
  
[3]  x x    x x    x 
Microsystems 
[4]
  x x x       x  
[5]  x x  x  x x    x 
[6]  x x    x x   x  
[7] x x x  x    x x   
FPGA-based [8]  x x   x   x x   
[9] x x x   x x x x x   
[10]  x x    x x     
[11]  x x   x     x  
Computer [12]  x x x  x x x  x  x 
architecture [13]  x  x   x x  x   
[14]  x  x  x x x  x   
DRAM [15] x    x  x  x x   
Evolutionary [16] x x x   x x  x x  x 
 
TABLE 3 
CURRENT METHODS FOR RESILIENT  OPERATION 
 
Technique Context Example of state-of-the-art 
 
Built-in self-test Perform off line integrity checks before commencing normal 
operation 
Power-On Self Test (POST) within computer BIOS 
Online status reporting       Real-time  fault checking General dashboard warning light 
Fault discrimination System-level diagnosis via sub-module  level BIT Specific dashboard warning light 
Fault monitoring Detect and log  fault occurrences SMART hard disk monitoring 
Fault masking Typically majority voting within  modular sub-system TMR controller for safety critical plant systems 
Active fault mitigation Active response to eliminate faults  within logic Data scrubbing 
Self-preservation Prediction and mitigation against faults Mostly found in electromechanical systems e.g., hard 
drive free-fall protection 
Error mitigation Correct errors that cannot be eliminated by fault mitigation EDC for memory modules 
 
 
 
assumed to compromise system dependability. Critical faults 
cause immediate, persistent and potentially cumulative errors. 
Even so, there is no guarantee that errors will be immediately 
observable. The susceptibility to fault-induced upsets increases 
with various factors, such as  increasing  die  area,  shrink-  
ing transistor gate dimension and reduced switching voltage. 
These are all common drivers in microelectronics and future 
nanoscale and printable electronics hence significant research 
effort has been directed towards faults occurring within future 
ASICs, interconnects and memory devices, especially those 
faults induced by radiation particle strikes [32]. In many cases 
physics of failure (PoF) models are used to help predict the 
likely system response. This evidence is then used to build a 
case for provision of redundant resources to be allocated at 
design-time and weighing up additional cost. 
2) Detecting faults: Considering board and sub-system 
levels, physical breakdown of printed circuit boards (PCB)    
is a major concern in high performance systems, especially  
for high-voltage applications. An example of a simple fault 
analysis of PCBs is summarised in Table V, where various 
symptoms and related processes of elimination that involve  
costly and time consuming design steps are characterised (see 
also [33]). This classification exemplifies the complexity and 
effort associated with maintenance where, at the sub-system 
level, procedures for monitoring and assessing potential fail- 
ures and mitigation strategies become increasingly complex. 
In critical applications, failure modes and effects analysis 
(FMEA) procedures may be employed  at  the  system  level 
to form predictive models for maintenance planning. This 
includes potential disruption caused by ‘No Fault Found (NFF) 
scenarios and strategic provision of built-in test (BIT) logic 
[34]. Indeed, BIT logic is viewed as beneficial at board and 
system levels provided the additional complexity is feasible. 
An example of this is shown in Table VII, where the relative 
cost/benefit of BIT is estimated [35]. These factors contribute 
to the overall maintainability and availability of the system 
[36]. Potential causes of failures are typically assessed by 
system experts and preventative or corrective courses of action 
are determined. FMEA is less commonly applied to low-  
level design due to the complexity of  analysing  all  sub-  
parts and hence is mostly confined to high-level integrity 
analysis. Degradation is also to be considered when designing 
zero-maintenance strategies; the onset of ageing may become 
accelerated in the presence of persistent faults hence mitigation 
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strategies offer the potential to slow this process by repair. 
Detection and monitoring is also extremely useful in demand- 
driven maintenance during the onset of ageing. 
3) Responding according to fault severity: Systemic and 
device-level faults give rise to  critical  errors  [37],  while  
soft errors arise from a number of different fault conditions 
[38]. In particular, dormant fault and sub-critical faults can 
remain unnoticed for some time before causing errors. Further 
upset mechanisms include electromagnetic interference (EMI), 
thermal cycling and mechanical degradation of packaging. 
Faults may also manifest as incorrect logic levels appearing at 
gate inputs/outputs or else bit upsets within memory contents 
(or indeed the manifestation of incorrect voltages/current com- 
ponents within analogue circuitry). Different error behaviours 
are possible depending upon their location and duration [39]. 
Examples include: errors that are overwritten and do not  
cause failures; latent errors that persist but which do not  
cause output failure (but may affect internal states); and errors 
that are detected and corrected. A more complete model for 
the relationship between faults, errors and failures has been 
proposed in [31]. 
4) Integrated self-maintenance: Many faults manifest as 
flaws during manufacture and, while these must be removed 
during test and repair before the product is worthy of selling, 
there is potential to continue the process of detection and repair 
into the useful lifetime via runtime and POST maintenance. As 
a result of yield issues, many high-density ICs contain large 
pools of redundant elements that are partly consumed during 
production BIST, but the remaining redundant elements and 
associated BIT logic remain inactive thereafter [40]. Even after 
built-in test and repair (BISTAR), it is conceivable that non- 
critical faults may have been inadvertently triggered during 
resource reallocation and may compromise normal operation. 
BISTAR will continue to feature in future FPGAs [41], con- 
figurable ASICs [42] and nanoscale electronics [43] and it has 
been suggested that BISTAR logic could be made available for 
runtime test or repair of logic [44] and interconnects [45]. 
Due to the above challenges, achieving zero-maintenance, 
in its most generic form, is not an easy problem to solve. In 
fact, most current maintenance design techniques solve only 
specific formulations of the problem. These efforts are further 
influenced by rapidly changing technology requirements and 
availability as well as investment costs for development and 
test, factors that are often determined by the industry domain 
in which maintenance is required. 
 
C. Formalisms of zero-maintenance 
In the context of this paper, zero-maintenance can perhaps 
be best viewed as a collection of capabilities that ensure 
error-free operation in the presence of faults occurring 
within an integrated sub-system or component, with min- 
imal external intervention. This is also related to the area of 
autonomous maintenance wherein autonomous systems take 
on similar capabilities, for example the use of external robotic 
systems to perform specific maintenance tasks [46]. A number 
of related maintenance requirements can be identified within 
the literature, though most come from related areas. A synopsis 
is given in Table  VI including an indication of state of the   
art. At their most basic level, faults (and errors potentially 
arising as a result) are masked and/or removed such that their 
influence is no longer critical to error-free operation. Thus a 
minimum condition of zero-maintenance is that all faults are 
made sub-critical. By the same measure, it is also desirable   
to address sub-critical faults by masking strategies. Design  
for zero-maintenance therefore comprises fault-tolerant design 
augmented by active detect and response capabilities  such 
that operational life is extended. Ideally fault-free operation   
is secured. 
 
III. QUANTIFYING ZERO-MAINTENANCE 
Several metrics have been considered for quantifying the 
performance of self-maintenance strategies. Their design-time 
prioritisation is application-dependent and each must be evalu- 
ated in terms of their reliance upon redundant and coordination 
resources. Moreover, such resources must be allocated at 
design-time. Existing metrics are summarised in Table VIII, 
including fault capacity and performance impact. There are 
few real-world examples where evaluation of these parameters 
has been reported in the open literature although some detailed 
FPGA studies have been summarised in [8]. 
An important step in the design process is test and eval- 
uation of the detection and mitigation strategy. Ideally this 
would be done within the actual hardware under test where 
emerging fault detection and mitigation strategies will aid with 
the test and verification of complex electronic systems. An 
example of this is the Slackprobe design for ARM processors 
that places embedded logic deep within strategic locations of 
the chip for critical timing monitoring. This logic is included 
within synthesis/layout steps and provides new insights into 
ageing effects as the timing becomes degraded. In may cases 
however the overhead associated with the test logic is high and 
data collected is not directly related to fault events. Besides 
embedded hardware monitoring, an alternative approach is to 
implement fault injection engine during the design evaluation 
phase. Fault injection is a more aggressive approach that 
emulates direct fault conditions at the hardware level under 
the control of a fault injection engine [52]. For low pin count 
ICs, hardware electronic faults may be injected directly. High- 
density devices such as ASICs and FPGAs require dedicated 
internal logic [53], [54]. A comprehensive description of fault 
injection techniques can be found in [55]. Fault injection has 
also been discussed at the transistor, gate, device and system 
level with in ASICs [56] but interconnect-related faults are not 
as well understood and further work is needed especially for 
self-repairing strategies [8]. 
Despite benefiting from mature software tools FPGAs are 
not optimised for on line reconfiguration. Fine-grained Triple 
Modular Redundancy (TMR) requires special considerations 
as discussed in [27]. Off-the-shelf solutions do exist that 
exploit either partial-reconfiguration facilities or else direct 
manipulation of the configuration bitstream. Several methods 
also exist for testing the resilience of FPGA strategies includ- 
ing stuck-at-faults, bitstream analysis, radiation testing and 
fault injection characterisation [10]. 
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Design, test Fabrication 
Production 
testing 
Mainte- 
nance Diagnosis, Service 
 
TABLE 4 
FAULTS  OCCURRING WITHIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
ESTABLISHED METHODS FOR PCB LEVEL TESTING AND REPAIR WITHOUT SELF-REPAIR STRATEGIES (ADAPTED FROM [33]). 
 
Fault type Cause of failure Eliminated by Failure model 
 
Layout Crosstalk, grounding, power rail 
noise, fan-in or fan-out violations 
Construction Inappropriate interconnect design 
or packaging, solder splash, bridg- 
ing, dry joints 
IC internal failures Fabrication defect, yield issue, 
packaging defect 
Correct application of  layout rules Stuck-at, intermittent 
Careful construction and inspection Stuck-at, bridging 
 
Careful construction, screening Stuck-at, metal-metal shorts 
Environment Accelerated component degradation Use components qualified for envi- 
ronment conditions 
Stuck-at, intermittent 
Degradation (time- 
dependent) 
Component ageing, modifications Preventative maintenance Stuck-at 
Design and 
implementation 
Critical races, static/dynamic errors, 
hazards 
Correct  design and validation Stuck-at, intermittent 
 
 
TABLE 6 
RELATED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS REPORTED IN THE ELECTRONIC DOMAIN 
 
Method Aim of strategy State of the art 
 
Built-in self-test Detection of fault caused by upset at power-on 
and/or run-time 
Fine-grained fault masking Fault masking at device level, possibly including 
fault identification 
Built-in self-reconfiguration Capability for online or offline design reconfigura- 
tion 
Automated SMART disk reporting [47] 
 
PaNDA chip [42]; interleaved logic; Gaisler Pro- 
cessors [48] 
Many lab demonstrations, but unclear whether used 
commercially 
Built-in self-reallocation Self-initiated reorganisation of logic fabric Fundamental research 
Robust state machines State machine encoding for  fault resilience Adopted in commercial designs 
Self-maintenance Correction of faults in-service (active operation or 
in standby). May initiate partial repair until next 
scheduled maintenance. 
Survivability Continuously recover from faults, consuming re- 
sources as necessary (possible at expense of per- 
formance) 
Self-diagnosis Ability to determine most effective course of action; 
reporting of remaining repair capacity. 
Self-preservation Able to reduce the impact of fault condition before 
major action is required 
Some commercial examples but mostly fundamen- 
tal research 
 
Systems for long-term space exploration 
 
Some software-based techniques [49]; MEMS in- 
tegrity test [50] 
Primarily electromechanical systems e.g., disk drive 
shock protection [51]. 
 
 
TABLE 7 
COST/BENEFIT FOR BIT, VIEWED FROM  VLSI PERSPECTIVE ADAPTED FROM  [35]. + COST INCREASE, - COST REDUCTION, +/- COST INCREASE LEADING  TO SAVING. 
 
 
 & dev.  testing repair interruption 
Chips +/- + -  
Boards +/- + - - 
Systems +/- + - - - - 
Abbr. Definition Description 
SEU Single event upset Single transient fault event 
SET Single event transient Transient pulse affecting gates and latches 
SBU Single bit upset Logical bit inversion within register/memory 
MBU Multiple bit upset Multiple register bits inversions 
MCU Multiple cell upset Faults manifesting/propagating within logic cells 
SEFI Single  event functional interrupt Produces observable failure at cell/block output 
SHE Single hard error Caused by single fault, commonly stuck-at 
SEL Single event latch-up Rail to rail short circuit in pnpn circuits 
SESB Single  event induced snap-back Rail to rail short circuit in nMOS circuit 
SEB Single event burnout Thermal runaway in power transistors 
SEGR Single  event gate rupture Breakdown of gate dielectric P
er
m
an
en
t 
T
ra
ns
ie
nt
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TABLE 8 
KEY PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR ASSESSING ZERO-MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES 
 
 
 Metric Description 
 
R
es
po
ns
e 
Fault coverage 
 
Fault granularity 
Fault capacity 
Performance reduction 
Latency 
Refers to fractional area of overall circuit that protected and 
diversity of faults that can be handled 
Minimum design layer at which faults can be detected/addressed 
Number of remaining faults that can be sustained by mitigation 
strategy 
Loss of application performance due to zero-maintenance opera- 
tions 
Time required for recovery 
 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 Resource overhead 
 
Resource re-use 
Energy usage 
Number of additional components needed over and above basic 
design 
Achieving efficient consumption of redundant resources (active 
methods) 
Energy consumed during recovery and consumed by additional 
resources overall 
 
D
ia
gn
os
ti
c Reporting 
Remaining lifetime 
 
Logging 
Discrimination & reporting of fault events at multiple system levels 
Indication of remaining operational hours after which faults will  
no longer be handled 
Capacity to store a log of fault history and classification 
 
IV. DESIGN MODELS FOR MITIGATION 
 
Mitigation strategies take the form of either distributed 
passive masking or active detect and respond. As noted earlier, 
some are already utilised in manufacturing test and repair and, 
to a lesser extent, degradation management. In the  former 
case detection followed by repair is sometimes referred to as 
built-in test and repair (BISTAR). There is a large class of 
platforms based on reconfigurable FPGAs and PLDs that are 
explored later in this section. An important question is how can 
the mitigation strategy determine the most appropriate level  
of response? A sub-component that is affected by transient 
upset will not benefit from active response capability since 
Mi ga on method 
SEU Permanent fault /ageing 
 
 
 
 
 
Mask 
 
 
Recon  gura  on Realloca on 
 
Fault severity 
 
 
Target 
performance 
unless permanent effects result; repairing temporary faults by 
reallocating valuable redundant resources is extremely ineffi- 
cient and would not address further occurrences of transient 
upset. Fault masking would be the primary design strategy    
in this case. In other cases however, the decision is less 
straightforward because both transient and permanent fault 
handling may be expected to occur and hence resources must 
be traded against design overall cost/benefit factors. In [57] 
general considerations of early fault-tolerant computers were 
explored and a number of questions raised: when  should  
fault tolerance be considered? How do errors manifest, human 
error, software fault or hardware fault? How is the benefit 
quantified? As stated earlier, the motivation for fault-tolerance 
has shifted from manufacturing consistency toward random 
and cumulative faults caused by environmental and ageing 
factors. 
To help set  the  context  for  design  for  zero-maintenance 
a suggested relationship between fault severity and design 
mitigation as given in Fig. 1 for a non-specific sub-component. 
A similar view was suggested by Noura et al in the context   
of resilient control systems [25]. The view presents several 
typical design considerations: the absolute of limit of fault tol- 
erance, the regions of applicability for each class of fault han- 
dling and the performance degradation for more sophisticated 
Fig. 1. Progressive strategy for fault-tolerant mitigation with performance 
impact (adapted from [25]). 
 
 
fault handling procedures. The anticipated impact on sub- 
component performance somewhat qualitative, but is indicative 
of the benefits of employing more complex maintenance 
strategies. Resource restructuring is a simple concept, but in 
practice involves a complex hardware reorganisation process 
that requires coordination and accurate fault diagnostics. This 
tends to become especially complex for current reconfigurable 
FPGA designs such as STAR  (self-test and repair) [58] that   
is capable of detecting and isolating faulty logic by activating 
spare logic, but which requires significant external processing 
resources. 
 
A. Passive methods 
Significant advances in electronics fabrication and packag- 
ing methods have taken place over the past decades and the 
perceived reliability and dependability of resulting ASICs is 
high. In recent years a re-emergence of passive mitigation has 
occurred in part to a response to new nanoscale electronics  
but also the onset of SEUs within current-generation ASICs. 
The most prevalent passive fault-tolerant strategy is n-modular 
Performance 
M
et
ric
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(c) 
to the origin of fault) and hence new architectures are needed 
to support this level of granularity. The benefits are clearly 
significant for integrity monitoring in the presence of transient 
upsets. 
1) Bottom-up design methods: Fine-grained strategies have 
seen specific interest recently owing to concerns over the 
Fig. 2. Majority strategies for fine-grained redundancy. (a) basic majority 
using logical voter (b) full majority logical voter (c) weighted analogue 
majority signal formed by summation of weighted contributions. In this 
example output of each module A1, A2, ..., A6 is weighted according to 
a1, a2, ...a6. 
 
redundancy (nMR) involving majority signalling. An early 
review of nMR design considerations for computer hardware 
is provided by Carter [13] while fundamental nMR concepts 
may be traced back to the much-cited work of Von Neumann 
[59] that was inspired by solutions observed in biological 
systems that construct resilient systems out of many spare 
components. Each component is assumed prone to  failure  
and hence error-free operation is secured in the presence of 
faults through massively redundant node, interconnections and 
majority signal blocks. Various majority signalling methods 
have been proposed including partial and full majority (Fig. 
2a-b) and summing (Fig. 2c). More recently, fault masking 
has again arisen as a key approach in nanoscale design but   
for now utilising small n [60]. Numerous variations on this 
theme exist, each bringing their own performance / resource 
trade-off at the fine-grained transistor or logic gate levels. 
The potential impact on availability and cost of ownership 
brought about by fault masking is considered further by 
Maxion [14]. Proven fault handling measures include self- 
purging [61], where the classical nMR with voter structure    
is modified to provide explicit fault detection and isolation of 
each module. The required switching mechanism constitutes a 
departure from purely fault masking to detect-isolate actions. 
In this case the overall reliability is highly dependent upon  
the individual switching reliability. Further augmentations to 
the TMR approach were suggested in [39] to include explicit 
detection and handling of  transient  and  permanent  errors.  
In this scheme, fault detection and self-reassertion of the 
correct logic state is possible within individual modules. In 
addition detect-isolate is performed when a permanent fault 
occurs in a single module, in which case the design reverts    
to a master/checker scheme. Although this implementation 
does not include a full self-reconfiguration implementation,   
it is attractive because there is minimal logic overhead in 
comparison to the conventional TMR implementation. Of 
course, the high resource overhead of the TMR scheme itself 
is still present. 
Graceful degradation is difficult to achieve by passive 
methods due to the inherently limited fault capacity. Although 
detection is not directly involved, it  is  possible  to  extract 
and utilise majority signals for basic diagnostics. This  is  
done at the modular level to generate enumerated states such 
as ‘ok’, ‘fault has occurred but still ok’, ‘cannot tolerate 
further faults’ (critical condition) and ‘unavailable’. Although 
feasible at the modular sub-system levels, their implementation 
requires considerable design effort at lower levels (i.e. closer 
vulnerabilities of emerging nanoscale and to some extent 
state-of-the-art printable electronics. At the lowest design 
levels, provisioning of redundant transistors has been discussed 
for compensating yield tolerance occurring during manufac- 
ture [62]. Such strategies inevitably involve compromises, 
namely redundancy overhead, complexity of fault detection 
and degradation of performance through the use of non- 
optimal transistors. However, within the zero-maintenance 
paradigm the benefits of graceful and predictable degradation 
and self management of faults are extremely attractive. At the 
sub-system level, online fault discrimination and monitoring 
operates at the modular level and within maintenance-heavy 
products, such as land, air and space vehicles, it becomes 
possible to monitor component aging via key response factors 
that that are expected to degrade more progressively  over 
time [2]. These methods focus on self-correction of stuck-     
at faults within nanoscale logic units, for which there are two 
reasons to consider fine-grained redundancy: firstly, fabrication 
processes are more prone to defect and variability [63] and  
the high density of nanoscale manufacturing exacerbates the 
challenge of high volume production. Secondly, the reduced 
device dimensions will result in increased susceptibility to in- 
service faults. With the advent of Large Scale Integrated (LSI) 
ICs, fine-grained redundancy was employed in mission critical 
electronic systems such the flight computer of the Apollo lunar 
mission. Its use was ultimately restricted due to improvements 
in manufacturing tolerances and the unfavourable view of 
maintenance at the time [64]. Increasing component density 
brings a number of issues relating to upset vulnerability and 
manufacturing defect that must be reduced so that these tech- 
nologies are able to complete with current silicon technologies. 
Further considerations include reduced operating and threshold 
voltage that, together with higher feature density, will lead to 
lower SEU immunity. Defect mitigation commands the highest 
effort in the first instance [31] but a number of approaches 
nonetheless been reported in recent years as summarised in 
Table IX. 
nMR has also been incorporated within FPGA config- 
urations at the block level [65], extended  to  fine-grained  
gate redundancy by a method closely related to quadded 
logic[60] and ultimately appearing at the transistor level via 
N-modulo redundancy (nMR) [66] and most commonly TMR 
implementations [67]. A further variation involves scrubbing 
in which the configuration is periodically refreshed from a 
golden bitstream [68]. This method is very popular due to its 
simplicity although service interruption does occur. In [43], 
multiplexed redundancy was considered at the lowest design 
levels to improve the reliability of logic gates. Future space 
exploration will further leverage fine-grained strategies wher- 
ever possible, principally because of the additional complexity 
of incorporating design for active repair [66]. Essentially, 
once a fault masking strategy has been determined it may be 
a1 a4 
A1 A4 
a2 a5 
A2 A5 
a3 
Σ 
a6 
A3 A6 
A1 
A2 
A3 
 
Voter 
A1 
 
A2 Voter 
A3 
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Fig. 3. Fine-grained passive redundancy principal for electronics. (a) quad 
transistor structure (b) standard CMOS NAND logic gate (c) equivalent quad 
redundant NAND design. 
 
 
applied fairly readily to hierarchical logic designs, whether 
fine-grained, cell or block level although evaluation of its 
resulting impact fault rate behaviour and associated reliability 
still needs to be performed. In [43], Han and Jonker noted  
that different strategies are likely to be required to address 
transient and permanent (and defect) related failures since the 
underlying binomial distribution applied to examine transient 
upset behaviour is unsuitable for modelling permanent faults, 
where statistical independence can no longer be assumed. 
Majority voting may occur as a function of the topology of  
the functional gate [69], the principle being to eliminate the 
classical voter logic by a summation of electrical currents at a 
common node. In this instance RoRa (reliability-oriented place 
and route) algorithms may be employed to instantiate TMR- 
like structures and evaluate them using V-Place, a model- 
based tool that uses a topology heuristic to assess and recover 
performance metrics. 
Information redundancy is a further long-established ap- 
proach distinguished by the fact that errors are allowed to 
occur and must be corrected. Although mainly as active miti- 
gation there exists hardware designs that exploit this approach 
when errors can be tolerated. For example, computing in the 
presence of noise caused by SEUs can be achieved when the 
numerical error created by an upset does not impinge upon  
the accuracy of the output [77]. 
 
B. Active methods 
In contrast to fault-masking redundancy methods, fault 
detection and reconfiguration aim to achieve fault tolerance 
via BISR capability. Sometimes this is referred to as built-in 
self-test and repair (BISTAR), the result of combining BIT  
and BIST. The contrasting behaviour of active and passive 
strategies is exemplified by revising Fig.1 where, for active 
strategies, redundant resources are called upon (and consumed) 
by rising fault severity. By contrast, passive strategies possess 
much more limited fault capacity in the form of redundant 
resource but offer fast recovery. Active methods are armed 
with sufficient resources to maintain a consistently higher fault 
capacity but with longer recovery times after each fault event. 
In the ideal case a combined strategy would only address 
transient faults by the masking method and permanent faults 
by the active method. 
BISTAR initiates a direct response to  an  upset  event  in 
the form of active alteration of the functional logic (and 
possibly additional dormant logic). BISTAR is fundamentally 
different to passive mitigation in that a measured response is 
taken by reorganising internal resources. The variety of active 
mitigation methods is summarised in Table X. Reorganisation 
usually involves a process of fault detection and localisation 
(possibly automated but most likely manual) followed by 
replacement of faulty logic with  logic  that  is  assumed  to  
be fully functional. An example  partial  reconfiguration  of  
an FPGA by user-initiated loading of a new bitstream after 
detecting a problem is suspected. This type of maintenance 
assistance can be highly sophisticated however it does not 
constitute self-repair. Self-diagnosis should also be qualified 
here: many circuits contain BIT  hardware  that  is designed to 
enhance the fault detection process, however these mostly 
require external test hardware to be connected in order to 
achieve diagnosis capability [78]. 
Built-in test (BIT) logic was originally created for produc- 
tion test and repair but lacks the detection capability proposed 
for online mitigation [79]. This approach has been refined 
over the years to improve the efficiency of production test, 
including the introduction of self-repair logic in memory 
chips. For example, redundant row and column cells  for  
more efficient repair [80] is essentially a more straightforward 
reallocation process whereby resources are reorganised to cir- 
cumvent defects. Once processed by the production tester, the 
configuration remains locked for the remaining lifetime of the 
component. The envisaged diagnostic, resource and response 
performance/cost trade-offs were considered in Table VIII and 
clearly the incorporation of self-repairing capabilities needs 
additional resources beyond those envisaged for the production 
test and repair. An example of this is seen in adaptive cache 
design where a variable trade-off is implemented in hardware 
[81]. 
1) Detection and classification: Detection in electronic 
sub-systems can occur online, during the active operation  
with minimal service interruption or offline, performed when 
the system is placed in a special diagnostic mode or else 
during power on self-test. Present-day detection is typically 
implemented using some form of boundary scan logic that is 
made available during offline test. In complex systems this is 
usually performed during regular or emergency maintenance 
and inspection. Offline detection is commonplace in produc- 
tion test and repair during which dedicated logic is activated 
to facilitate the test and repair process [35]. Notably however, 
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complexity is retained within production test units that are only 
available during production. Extensions have been proposed 
that increase the on-chip complexity in lieu of faster overall 
test procedures [87]. Beyond production BIT and BIST, the 
principles of detection lies within the wider research area of 
anomaly detection [88]. For example, at higher system levels 
cluster analysis is a powerful data-driven approach for system- 
level health monitoring and diagnostic [89]. However, in the 
context of this paper it is assumed that detection logic is 
needed much closer to the point of origin of faults, requiring  
a step-change in design and integration practices. The goal  
has become to ensure that errors are not permitted to manifest 
within electronic logic, interconnections and memory. Fault 
discrimination is a critical augmentation of detection and 
opportunities exist within microelectronics design to integrate 
detection and discrimination close to the point of fault, includ- 
ing assessment of the seriousness of fault. This is made all   
the more important given detection is the first step towards all 
active mitigation strategies. In contrast, masking approaches 
do not depend upon online fault detection, but instead majority 
signals are produced that, in turn, generate signals that reflect 
the current integrity in the presence of threats. Logging and 
reporting of fault events is clearly a further desirable feature 
within the general maintenance model, however detection and 
counting of transient upsets is not trivial. Active mitigation    
is however very well-suited to status monitoring even before 
active recovery is considered. 
There are examples when fault detection is not used but 
instead the masking strategy is primed to initiate a default re- 
sponse should particular error occur. Examples include switch- 
over [36], RAID data storage and error detection and cor- 
rection (EDC) codes. EDC operates by exploring redundancy 
applied at the information level by data coding. This differs 
from hardware mitigation since errors are allowed to manifest 
and are then corrected. In contrast, hardware methods seek    
to prevent errors from arising when faults occur. EDC is 
however extremely popular in memory ICs due to regular 
architecture of memory cells that  allows  direct  application 
of data codes. An abstraction between hardware and EDC 
strategies is sometimes apparent for example, in the protection 
Method Example 
Quad-structures [70], [71] 
N2-transistor structures [72] 
Triple transistor structures for 
CMOS logic 
Yield enhancement for next-gen 
electronics 
[73] 
[74], [75] 
Interleaved logic and 
interconnect [60] 
Multiplexed redundancy [43] 
FPGA configuration [76] 
Mechanism(s) 
Quad transistors arranged in serial/parallel 
fault tolerance. Output is formed from 
majority of pull up/down resistor current. 
Massively-redundant micro-architectures; 
variant of quad structures. 
Triple transistor redundancy scheme for 
minimal area overhead. 
Redundant transistors designed to be 
allocated only during production test 
Send multiple copies of logic levels to 
redundant gates so that output is calculated 
several times. This provides majority output 
and can be arranged to inherently mask 
certain faults. 
Redundancy via additional interconnections 
Provisioning additional resources ar 
programmable block level 
Method State of the art 
Resources organised during test mode. 
Valid for chip, package and SoC level test 
& diagnostics. 
Transistor-level reorganisation using 
switch-over. 
Fault & mitigation for critical sub-systems 
that must not be interrupted; integrated 
self-test & repair. 
Errors permitted to occur then corrected at 
data level 
Example 
Offline test and 
repair (BISTAR) 
[15], [44], [35] 
Fine-grained 
reallocation [82] 
Online test and 
repair 
Autonomous fault management; ECSS F3 
on-board fault management [83] 
Error mitigation [48], [84] 
Self-healing 
Autonomic reorganisation, possibly without 
explicit detection; 
FLASH memory recovery, self-healing 
materials; interconnect possible but very 
low TRL. [85], [86] 
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of configuration bitstreams for FPGAs. In this case EDC is 
used to protect data patterns that are in turn responsible for 
hardware configuration [9]. However the respective detection 
strategies are still distinct. A further example is when EDC 
applied to protect look up tables (LUT) that in turn implement 
finite state machines (FSM). Whereas the FSM is traditionally 
implemented as a combination of LUT data and execution 
logic, it is possible in some cases to implement the FSM 
almost entirely out of memory and therefore EDC becomes 
the predominant detection mechanism. Alternatively, fault 
tolerance may be encoded at the state level [90]. Once again, 
errors are allowed to occur and exist until repaired by the EDC 
strategy. A further variation of this case is when the FSM is 
provisioned with both hardware fault mitigation and EDC, thus 
protecting against different fault mechanisms [84]. Detection 
also appears in the context of self-healing technologies [22] 
where autonomic responses are triggered upon certain events. 
In Table XI a summary of fault detection strategies related 
mostly to modular designs is presented. 
Fine-grained built-in test (BIT) strategies represent an im- 
portant step towards zero-maintenance capability in electronic 
sub-systems because they require that faulty conditions are 
identified and localised before the response is formulated. 
Another case is that of remotely activated BIST using the 
System JTAG (SJTAG) method [91] wherein the test itself is 
offline but is activated by a remote data centre. By comparison, 
online detection is still in its relative infancy but will bring  
the facility to identify faults during normal operation with 
minimal impact on overall performance. Zero-maintenance 
requires considerably more complex design effort to gather 
useful information to inform the recovery process. One future 
strategy is to make extensive use of hardware fault detection 
at the lowest design levels in conjunction with fine-grained 
redundant design with new BIT logic [92]. This marks a 
departure from the reliance upon traditional external test units 
and a step towards online BIST. 
Chip- and board-level system considerations are also impor- 
tant, especially the integrity of interconnects. This is an espe- 
cially challenging area that has been considered as part of the 
boundary scan approach [45]. There has been limited progress 
in this area although IEEE standard 1149.1 has evolved to 
cater for multi-chip modules (MCMs) [93], on-chip test and 
even hardware emulation and debug. Analogue time-domain 
refractometry (TDR) approaches have also been proposed to 
improve fault coverage and retain low MCM complexity [94]. 
In most cases online operation is not considered and hence the 
addition of field support phase capability has been discussed 
with respect to modified boundary scan hardware [44] and 
could potentially be applied at the board or system levels.  
This would essentially constitute an automated approach to 
circumvention of localised board issues. Beyond this however, 
there is a great need for further work in interconnect-level fault 
detection they represent critical points of failure and methods 
are confined to production test [95]. 
2) Self-reconfiguration: Off-the-shelf FPGA devices con- 
tain reconfiguration logic coordinated by user-provided config- 
uration bitstream that has been generated by software design 
tools and is typically fixed at design-time. These devices have 
become highly popular and  have  been  identified as critical 
to system dependability in many applications [96]. At the 
same time, SoC platforms such as the  Zync  and  Cyclone 
SoC include integrated processors for runtime reconfiguration 
of programmable FPGA resources including logic, LUTs, 
memory and interconnects. The principle of reconfiguring 
resources within an FPGA in response to faults is discussed 
in [97], noting that the configuration fabric itself remains 
fixed. Resource utilisation in such cases rarely approaches 
100% and therefore unused memory blocks, look up tables, 
logic resources are available even within complex designs. The 
challenge associated reconfiguration however lies in effective 
detection, coordination and resource coverage within the de- 
tection strategy. Since access to available resources tend to be 
clustered with limited granularity, coverage must be carefully 
managed otherwise available resources may not be accessible. 
An external governing process is usually needed that oper- 
ates online or offline depending on the implementation. This 
process may take one of two forms: alternative pre-verified 
bitstreams stored externally and loaded into the device [98] 
or direct manipulation of  the  live  bitstream  by an internal 
or external governing process. Embedded or software-defined 
processors have been proposed as part of this but are con- 
sidered analogous to external processors in terms of resource 
usage. Sophisticated algorithms such as the STAR approach 
[99] attempt to self-manage dynamic resource allocation by 
quarantining active logic that is under test, with the intention 
that areas of memory and logic affected by faults are less likely 
to generate errors. 
Besides FPGA chips, reconfiguration is also performed 
within multi-processor hardware where, again, the underlying 
logic fabric remains fixed but the resource utilisation is dy- 
namically managed by software techniques depending on fault 
conditions. Typical examples include load balancing and ther- 
mal management as well as modular standby sub-components. 
Finally, the fault-tolerant properties of neural networks have 
been investigated by incorporating TMR principles into the 
network [100]. A summary of key design features expected of 
reconfigurable computer systems can be found in Table XII. 
The most flexible of all active response strategies involves 
dynamic resource reallocation using a generic pool of re- 
sources. Here, the underlying logic fabric itself may be al- 
tered and manipulated in response to persistent fault events. 
Dynamic allocation involves substitution of faulty logic and 
interconnect with healthy hardware in response to a variety of 
fault conditions. Successful strategies include heterogeneous 
architectures arranged as a pool of available resources with 
multiple fixed logic designs that achieve the same task, but 
each of which have different fault behaviours, thus providing 
resilience against systemic failures [101]. Kothe (2006) dis- 
cusses a method for direct reconfiguration at the fine-grained 
transistor level [82] where a switching fabric is included at the 
transistor level. Self-coordination at the logic cell level uses 
simple trigger-based signals to activate or deactivate each cell. 
This method is related to bio-inspired cellular arrays, and in 
particular cellular automata, whose functionality is defined by 
DNA-like instructions stored by cells organised as a regular 
array structure. This approach is conceptually attractive due to 
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the relatively simple rule sets that govern global functionality. 
 
 
Other instances of self-organisation include dynamic re- 
allocation of microprocessors workloads in the event of a 
failed worker [102] and self-assembly of patterns by conver- 
gent cellular automata that are used to coordinate functional 
logic cells [103]. The latter achieves self-reassembly of the 
correct configuration even in the event that every cells state is 
randomised. The Plastic Cellular Architecture (PCA) has also 
been suggested [104] taking the form of a CA coordination 
layer together with a reconfigurable functional logic layer 
called a ”reconfigurable  plane”.  Taken  together,  they  form 
a self-reconfiguring logic mechanism even though self-repair 
was not the original focus of this work. Evolutionary algo- 
rithms may also be applied to drive self-reconfiguration [105] 
in which the rule sets are dynamically evolved over time. In 
[106] a self-recovery mechanism based on a diffusion model is 
demonstrated using a reconfigurable hardware platform. A fur- 
ther approach uses the redundant genetic information observed 
in prokaryote organisms to create an artificial prokaryote that 
controls circuit configuration [107]. 
V. TOWARDS A DESIGN STRATEGY FOR 
ZERO-MAINTENANCE 
From  the  above  overview,  it  is  clear  that  a  multitude  
of strategies relating to maintenance exists that should be 
carefully matched to the  application.  This  section attempts 
to set out a forward strategy for designing zero-maintenance 
into electronic sub-systems and components with reference to 
the literature classified according to the components of zero- 
maintenance. A summary of applicable methods is set out in 
Table XIII in terms of passive and active mechanisms. 
For the case of transient upset mitigation the resource 
requirement is likely to be fixed and the degree of overhead is 
directly linked to expected fault frequency and corresponding 
fault capacity. Active mitigation strategies are capable of 
dynamically issuing redundant elements  during  the  course  
of operation but resource allocation is considerably more 
complex and must be determined at design-time. Therefore, 
redundant resources depicted in Fig. 1 will consumed as 
cumulative permanent faults occur over time. 
An example design for mitigation is seen in for control 
systems and signal processing applications, where it was noted 
that system performance degradation is traded for enhanced 
Method 
 
Checkpointing 
Spare module 
Duplicate & match 
 
Hardware error 
detection and 
correction (EDC) 
Temporal redundancy 
State machine 
encoding 
 
Virtual TMR 
 
 
System-level voting 
Mechanism 
Save known good state for potential future roll-back. Usually 
software implemented. 
A duplicate module exists in either online or offline state. This is 
activated when a problem is detected. Requires fault detection. 
Primitive of TMR: perform same operation twice and compare 
results. Often implemented using design diversity i.e., two 
different implementations are used to help avoid systemic errors. 
Generally performed on data to be stored and transmitted. 
Redundancy is introduced into the data set itself such that certain 
errors caused by fault are detected and corrected. 
Time-sharing of resources in order to generate majority vote. 
Protection by inserting of redundant states that indicate error 
states. 
Uses reconfigurable logic blocks to implement TMR when 
configured correctly. Implementations can be dynamic. 
Abstract levels of majority voting to determine system 
correctness at high level e.g. software level in computing. 
Somewhat independent of underlying hardware and does not 
provide indication of cause of error. 
Feature 
Reprogrammable 
Configuration means 
Regular architecture 
Embedded processors 
 
Partial reconfiguration 
Description 
Configuration by bitstream or machine code, which can be updated and reloaded. 
Access to configuration bitstream (FPGAs) or instruction memory (processors) 
Multiple identical arrays of logic and memory fabric arranged in a regular fashion. 
Specific to FPGAs: software-defined processor allow complex task management with 
hardware resource abstraction. 
Pre-verified configurations (FPGA) or machine code (processors) primed for fast 
reconfiguration of select resources without halting active task. 
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≤ 
fault-tolerance [25], [108], [109]. This compromise was gen- 
eralised in Fig. 1 to include redundant resource requirement. 
As previously discussed, passive strategies mitigate through 
masking faults without explicit detection and seek to continue 
in the presence of those faults without error. Active strategies 
rely instead upon explicit fault detection before taking action 
to remove faulty logic. Clearly it is important in the latter case 
to avoid false alarms triggered by transient faults that cannot 
be effectively handled by an active response. Even when 
considering the advancements made key questions remain: 
how is the integrity of redundant resources ensured, should 
they be trusted? This may merit a self-test of standby resources 
before their allocation in response to fault events. A related 
issue is integrity of redundant resource pool monitoring and 
communication of remaining resources to the upper design 
levels. Last but not least–how can integrity of checking logic 
be ensured? 
 
A. Design Perspectives 
High-value industrial systems are synonymous with high 
recurring maintenance, repair and overhaul effort that increases 
the overall cost of through-life support [1]. Failures associated 
with electronic sub-components lead to costly repair activity 
and down-time, a symptom that is on the increase within elec- 
tronic components. OEM and system integrators therefore seek 
new design methods driven within the electronics domain by 
increasing IC density, shrinking transistor critical dimension, 
aggressive voltage and frequency scaling and increasingly 
complex interconnect and packaging. 
Evidence of existing design aspects in that relate zero- 
maintenance in electronics has been gathered in Table VI, 
while a deeper analysis of passive mitigation strategies is 
presented in Table XIV. Although several instances relate to 
production test and repair, EDC has appeared within low- 
level hardware including FSM logic. Fine-grained transistor 
level strategies have matured in production yield enhancement 
but further opportunities exist  to  extend  this  to  through-  
life operation. An alternative yield method relates to direct 
mitigation against signal delays caused variability in sequential 
logic components such as flip flops [110]. nMR methods have 
seem most use within masking strategies, including quad- 
redundancy, but are generally limited to TMR within FPGAs. 
In the latter case, FPGA reconfiguration is not necessary since 
the strategy allocates fixed resources for fault masking. By 
contrast, active methods are classified in Table XV including 
custom ASIC, COTS FPGA and mixed signal strategies. There 
is a good representation of both online and offline approaches– 
though again modular methods are limited to n 4. 
A significant challenge to zero-maintenance is that signifi- 
cant design effort must be invested at the outset on minimising 
susceptibility to error events that are prevalent to the appli- 
cation. In some cases it becomes economically infeasible or 
technically implausible to eliminate fault events. An example 
is radiation hardening, which can be achieved using special 
shielding materials, but adds design complexity in order to 
meet thermal and weight specifications. An alternative is to 
use rad-hard chips that are considerably more expensive and 
are typically not available in current-generation designs unless 
full custom design is undertaken. Indeed the current trend is to 
use state of the art commercial and off-the-shelf (COTS) chips 
due to their higher performance and lower power consumption. 
This is true even for high-value sectors such as transport and 
space exploration that need high performance and reliability. 
The automotive industry is now using high performance SoC 
wherein critical sub-systems (steering, braking) run concur- 
rently with non-critical services (entertainment and navigation 
interfaces) all with low power consumption. 
Integration of both passive and active strategies is likely 
since each brings their specific benefits and by the fact that 
various fault scenarios might be encountered during through- 
life operation. Combined strategies have been considered in 
robust microprocessors for some time–an early example seen 
in [126], where modular redundancy was used. Modern strate- 
gies tend to be more concentrated towards the fine grained 
levels while retaining some  degree  of  modular redundancy 
at higher design levels. Though by no means complete, the 
Tables XIV & XV illustrate the breadth of techniques in use or 
demonstrated in principle. Yet integrated design methodologies 
are comparatively under-developed. Recognising the need for 
an integrated view, Henkel (2014) proposes a map of ‘Multi- 
layer dependability modelling and optimization’ for electron- 
ics micro-architectures in [12] that demonstrates the wide 
range of available design options. In addition, advancements 
in hardware and open-source software have been accelerated 
for implementing concepts related to deep learning and support 
libraries. These include improvements in Graphical Processing 
Units (GPUs) as well as  work  on  other  technologies  such 
as FPGAs, Tensor Processing Units (TPUs), and other chip 
systems and architectures that match specific artificial intel- 
ligence (AI) and machine learning requirements [89]. With   
an emphasis on bridging these gaps in AI, novel chips are 
being built to support different computing models. E.g., Intel is 
introducing an AI-oriented processor the Intel Nervana Neural 
Network Processor which is a purpose-built architecture for 
deep learning, and Huawei’s Kirin 970 mobile AI computing 
platform. Such technology platforms not only influences per- 
formance but also cut down costs for organisations who will 
be making use of these systems in the future. 
Generalising to higher design layers or cross-layer tech- 
niques, allow us to bring benefits to more than one design 
level, and are essential  in  order  to  leverage the investment 
of zero-maintenance resources. As an example, re-use of 
fault information generated at device levels for higher levels, 
e.g., using fault information generated during fault masking 
operations at the application layer during maintenance assess- 
ment would achieve greater design benefits. The qualitative 
relationship between performance and resource metrics was 
illustrated in Fig. 1. There is, however, a lack of detailed 
trade-off analysis for different  methods.  A  top-level  view 
of the possible operations involved within a complex zero- 
maintenance design is depicted in Fig. 5. Note that, although 
masking is included in this scheme, there is no active response. 
As discussed in Section IV-B1, fault event monitoring and 
reporting is particular to the zero-maintenance paradigm and 
should be carried out in all cases i.e., passive or active fault 
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TABLE 13 
FUNDAMENTAL ZERO-MAINTENANCE DESIGN STRATEGIES 
 
 
TABLE 14 
CLASSIFICATION OF PROMINENT PASSIVE MASKING STRATEGIES (FIXED CONFIGURATION) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 
  
 [60]  x   x  x   x 
 [73] x   x      x 
Fault mask- [72]  x x x      x 
ing [59]   x   x x    
 [43]   x  x x    x 
 [42]   x x      x 
 [4]        x x  
Error Correc- 
tion 
[48] 
[84] 
[111] 
x 
 
x 
  
x 
  x 
x 
x 
  
x 
  
 [112] x     x  x   
 [113]   x   x  x   
 [6] x     x  x   
FPGA imple- [27] x     x     
mented [114] x     x  x   
 [115]   x    x   x 
 
and so that trends such as varying SEU rates may be analysed. 
Fault management via active mitigation is a desirable concept 
in zero-maintenance that has not yet seen adoption acceptance 
within critical applications such as transportation (aviation, 
rail, automotive) and space. Further complications face active 
strategies that display complex behaviour since their complex 
behaviour can be difficult to certify. A further factor is a lack 
of standards though progress is being made in autonomous 
vehicles and space exploration [83]. 
 
B. Hierarchical perspective 
Design for zero-maintenance must lead to higher intrinsic 
systems robustness and dependability while at the same time 
reducing the overall complexity and frequency of maintenance 
operations. Lessons have been learned in some high-volume 
electronic products, such as electromechanical hard disk drives 
[127], where the traditional assumptions about hazards rates 
for early and useful life periods do not apply in the same way 
as for previous electronic ICs. This gave rise to initiatives    
for introducing built-in test and self-diagnosis capabilities 
[128]. In addition, health monitoring utilises external sensor 
data for accelerated testing to better understand degradation 
effects [129]. It is notable, however, that these methods are 
hardware/software codependent and thus are coordinated at 
the higher system levels. 
A useful perspective is to regard zero-maintenance as a 
multi-level design problem in similar fashion to the highly in- 
tegrated nature of electronic systems design. An early analysis 
Strategy 
 
Fault quarantine 
Fault detection 
 
 
Retry/scrub 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-healing 
Mechanism 
 
Limit spread of fault 
Built-in checking for 
presence of faults 
Continue in presence of 
faults 
Simple fault eradication 
Detect and report on fault 
events 
Adapt to eradicate 
permanent faults 
Reallocate resources and 
combine multiple methods. 
Active or 
passive 
Passive 
Active 
Fault masking Passive 
Active 
Fault classify Active 
Example recovery mechanism (if 
applicable) 
None, but may assist future repair 
Masking voters; next-gen boundary 
scan; error-detection 
nMR; EDC; reduced precision; 
interleaving; FSM-coding 
Not a direct repair operation 
None; but important for status and 
active mitigation 
Self-reconfiguration Active Autonomous FPGA reconfiguration 
Both 
Self-healing materials; cellular 
automata 
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TABLE 15 
CLASSIFICATION OF PROMINENT ACTIVE MITIGATION STRATEGIES BASED ON RECONFIGURATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 
  
Time-shared [3] x    x   x     
redundancy [112] x    x   x     
 [116] x     x  x     
ASIC [82] x  x x         
(fine-grained) [117]  x x x         
 [106] x      x      
ASIC, [118] x      x      
(heterogeneous) [119]  x x   x       
 [120]  x x   x       
 [99]  x x    x      
FPGA [121] x  x    x      
implementations [122]  x x    x      
 [123] x x x      x    
 [77] x   x     x   x 
Analogue & [86] x         x   
mixed-signal [124]  x         x  
 [125]  x         x  
 
of the cost/benefit expected from traditional BIT techniques for 
VLSI was provided by Agrawal in 1993 [35]. More recently, 
Henkel provided a categorization of strategies specific to on- 
chip systems [130], where the priority areas of manufacturing 
variability, ageing, soft-errors and hardware mitigation were 
identified as key to design for resilience. This viewpoint can 
be broadened slightly to include key system levels of interest 
to zero maintenance: 
• Application level: fault reporting, fault capacity, assess- 
ment and scheduling of swap-out or refurbishment 
• Software level: resource awareness and adaptability e.g., 
multiple core management; software fault flagging 
• Integrated hardware level: board and interconnect failures 
between sub-module interconnections and wiring looms; 
interfaces for diagnostic information, power-on self-test 
• Integrated chip level: System-on-Chip and micro- 
architectures; cellular reallocation; reconfiguration; adap- 
tive analogue methods 
• Cell, gate and transistor levels: component redundancy; 
individual fault masking and detection; variability and 
yield compensation 
From this analysis, we suggest the design hierarchy model in 
Figure 4 that considers the technological categories relevant  
to zero-maintenance and requirement for fault prognostics and 
diagnostics. 
Further inspiration is found in technologies for extreme 
harsh environments such as unmanned space exploration mis- 
sion will require ultra-reliable craft and vehicles for long- 
term colonisation [131]. For these cases, future developments 
will need to address enhanced resilience against component 
ageing, thermal stressing and soft/hard-errors. A variety of 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.   Proposed hierarchy of design for zero maintenance in electronics.    
In respect to fault prognostics/diagnostics, a solid arrow suggests the flow of 
fault awareness and action taken while a dashed arrow suggests information 
flow only. 
 
 
 
self-healing technologies are likely to contribute, albeit each 
having realistic limitations. An example of this is recovery of 
flash memory technology via built-in energy pulsing [132]. 
Annealing of the wear characteristic was demonstrated but 
under specific conditions. Intense radiation is a major concern 
not only for exploration but also avionics and satellites and    
is the subject of many studies [133]. Fine-grained redundancy 
for autonomous applications has been discussed for situations 
in which human intervention is hazardous or impossible with 
applications in deep sea exploration, nuclear inspection, deep 
drilling and mining [134], [135]. Fault events cause serious 
consequences for safety critical systems and often require 
costly fault-finding and maintenance. When subjected to one 
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or more of these influences the resulting sub-system behaviour 
can be somewhat complex and difficult to predict. One pos- 
sible model considers faults occurring at different system 
levels in electronic components wafer (transistor, interconnect, 
metal layers on wafer), packaging (ASIC, FPGA, package 
wires, chip to chip connections, SoC interconnects) and sub- 
component (PCB, packaging, cables and connectors). However 
it is not clear from this how errors proliferate into malfunctions 
across different systems levels. This is compounded by the 
challenge of fault detection and location. FMEA originated 
from the design of flight electronic systems in the 1950s [136] 
and specifically aims to identify corrective actions needed to 
prevent failures by an exhaustive analysis of system com- 
ponents and identification of failure modes and probabilities 
and possible detection and recovery action steps. PSPICE 
modeling can be helpful in determining component ratings 
(thermal, voltage/current and noise) and to recommend de- 
rating where necessary. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that a structured design 
methodology is required to address zero-maintenance within 
electronics. With this in mind a breakdown of key challenges 
with this model is proposed in Table XVI, in which key mech- 
anisms are described according to known existing strategies 
together with potential benefits and challenges in the context 
of zero-maintenance. There is evidence of similar hierarchical 
considerations at the lower design levels in [137], where a 
BISR architecture is defined up to the cellular hardware level. 
Since the available passive and active methods span all 
hardware layers from fine-grained logic to reconfigurable logic 
fabric, it necessary to integrate design strategies across most 
hardware design levels. Within this structure, it is important  
to consider the specific benefits to real-world maintenance 
aspects and in particular effective detection and integration 
with software methods. By way of example, GPUs provide an 
interesting case in point because they already utilise a variety 
of error-handling strategies. Depending upon the architecture 
used a combination of low-level hardware EDC to protect 
vulnerable high-density memory areas [138] and a high-level 
error tolerance due to the visual latitude of the application      
is exploited [26]. There is however some debate over the 
benefit of low-level hardware EDC protection since software 
redundant methods have also been shown to be effective [139]. 
Furthermore, this model generally allows errors to manifest 
rather than mitigating against the underlying faults. A fault- 
tolerant design approach faces similar design decisions. 
Evidence of package-level mitigation (Table II) and inter- 
connect fault handling (Table  XIV) exists. However there is   
a great need for enhanced test and verification for state of    
the art system on chip (SoC) and system in package (SiP) 
technologies for supporting design validation as well as fault- 
handling. This need straddles multiple design levels, with fault 
detection and status monitoring placed as close as possible to 
the point of origin of faults. The hierarchical model extends 
further to electro-mechanical interfaces, as seen in MEMS 
integrated design [140][141][142], and ultimately into the 
higher software layers. 
C. Application-specific considerations 
Fault mitigation has in-part driven the evolution of some 
COTS devices such as FPGA and microcontrollers. Radation- 
hardened FGPAs have been developed but functional resilience 
capabilities have also been introduced for fault  tolerance.  
The potential impact of fault-tolerance within FPGAs has 
been considered at the electromechanical system level of a 
robot [143]. Specific examples discussed earlier in Section IV 
included bitstream EDC, managed partial reconfiguration and 
runtime manipulation of the configuration, each of which may 
be exploited in mission critical applications and online [144]. 
COTS ICs have also acquired EDC protection for internal 
registers and on-chip redundancy although such measures do 
not address the problem of eliminating faults at the outset [48], 
[4]. Furthermore, state of the art reconfigurable platforms now 
contain their own hard-wired microprocessor cores (and even 
larger pools of SRAM) fully integrated on-chip and therefore 
on line detect and thus self-repair has become an important 
area of research. Once again this indicates a merging between 
passive and active fault mitigation for microprocessors and 
reconfigurable platforms. 
A clear assessment of technology readiness  level  (TRL) 
for zero-maintenance methods is difficult due to the emergent 
nature of most methods. Examples of state-of-the-art are listed 
in Table XVII based on the known examples. Factors that 
influence technology readiness include co-software/hardware 
demonstration level, proven reliability of the design and 
assessment of potential impact on fabrication cost. This is 
evident in examples of microprocessor design [19], pro- 
grammable logic chips [42] and RF microelectronics [86]. 
Future applications include security (attack and defend), FDIR 
(Fault detection, isolation, recovery) and ISHM (Integrated 
System Health Management) [131]. An important indicator in 
this context will be integration readiness level (IRL) proposed 
for evaluating the complexity of integrating related strategies 
into existing space exploration systems [145]. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
Over the past few years, a number of maintenance re- 
quirements have emerged within engineering systems and 
have gained considerable focus in the areas of detection, 
classification and self-recovery from fault conditions. The 
increasing demand for robust products, composed of complex 
sub-systems that must maintain the longest possible opera- 
tional life-span, has brought self-repairing capability firmly 
into the design and manufacturing fray. At the same time, 
electronic sub-systems have become particularly vulnerable to 
environmentally-induced random and cumulative fault condi- 
tions and thus a significant body of literature has appeared  
that seeks to exploit the unique flexibility available within 
electronics for fault mitigation. As such, the authors have 
observed a number of recent trends paving the way towards 
zero-maintenance designs for electronics with the common 
goal of regaining: robust, error-resilient operation with major 
impacts expected in product availability and cost of mainte- 
nance. From fault detection and classification to passive and 
active fault mitigation, integrated self-recovery is becoming 
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Response 
Available 
 
A parameter value 
has deviated 
Report 
status 
Con rm 
coverage 
Execute 
response 
 
Calculate 
fault 
capacity 
Permanent error 
has occurred 
Fault 
event 
Confirm/report 
Mask fault 
Transient fault 
has occurred 
Data EDC 
Centralised or localised control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detect 
TABLE 16 
DETAILED HIERARCHY FOR ZERO-MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES 
 
 
Method Benefits Challenges 
 
Status reporting 
Logging key metrics (remaining capacity, 
faults classification etc.) to assist 
maintenance planning 
Fault signals must traverse multiple design 
levels; effective filtering and interpreting of 
signals at application layer 
 
Self-maintenance 
Correction faults in-service (and online 
where possible) using a variety of actions 
to prolong operational window 
Will most likely require several  strategies 
across multiple integrated levels: masking, 
detection/reporting and active reallocation 
 
Built-in self-test and 
repair (BISTAR) Combined detection and restoration on chip 
Requires detect and active logic for 
reallocation of resources. Difficult to 
validate all possible states 
 
Built-in 
reconfiguration 
Capability to restore correct operation in 
the event of fault 
Relies upon a reconfigurable chip. Usually 
requires external initiation 
 
Supervised repair 
(production yield 
enhancement) 
Highly efficient reallocation of resources 
for reduced failure rate 
Requires complex production tester and 
precisely controlled environment 
 
Built-in self-test 
(BIT) 
Relatively simple logic overhead; detection 
of errors at specific intervals 
Often limited to detecting persistent faults 
power on time 
 
Self-preservation / 
fault avoidance 
Put measures in place to reduce impact of 
further faults 
Requires accurate monitoring, possibly 
anticipation of impending fault events 
 
Fault masking Fixed structure; validation is relatively easy 
Of limited fault capacity, can become 
potentially high resource overhead for 
fine-grained strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Depiction of a possible top-level design of zero-maintenance systems with various options. Several implementations are possible: the example shown 
here includes masking and active response for permanent error or analogue parameter. Collection of status including evaluation of available resources are also 
shown. 
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TABLE 17 
APPLICATION EXAMPLES LINKED TO ZERO-MAINTENANCE FOR HIGH-VALUE SECTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adopted within the electrical and electronic discipline; coupled 
systems with significant benefits to be seen across transport, 
health care, mining/exploration, nuclear energy and space 
exploration engineering systems. The aim was to set out the 
potential impacts with regard to intermittent fault scenarios and 
the overall maintenance cost overheads, that plague modern 
complex systems. This is principally due to the fact that: 
• Electronics support the necessary flexibility for provision 
of resources and built-in intelligence; 
• Upset mechanisms are projected to become more preva- 
lent within next-generation nanoscale design; 
• Aggressive scaling of COTS devices towards the neces- 
sary complexity, especially with regard to online detec- 
tion and resource allocation. 
In the light of the above mentioned, the authors had noted 
significant recent research activity reported in future nanoscale 
analogue and digital design, contemporary CMOS, current 
and future configurable integrated circuits, electromechanical 
sub-systems and assemblies, complex mechatronic and cyber 
physical systems. As a consequence, this paper considered the 
current and future technology trends that will make possible a 
zero-maintenance design; that is based on masking and active 
mitigation techniques driven by emerging nano- and printable- 
electronics technologies. This includes built-in fault detection 
and logging, fine-grained redundancy (with new possibilities 
for masking), self-reconfiguration and self-reallocation. An 
alternative perspective is that zero-maintenance is composed of 
methods for self-monitoring and self-management of internal 
redundant resources. It is also clear that, rather than being 
outdated, passive masking strategies have an important role to 
play in some environments though they become ineffectual as 
ageing-related faults begin to manifest. 
 
A. Future opportunities 
Several opportunities exist for fundamental advancement in 
this area: novel detection mechanisms need to be identified to 
underpin masking and reconfiguration strategies; The handling 
of interconnect-related failures is sorely neglected [8] and 
needs further research work to understand its impact upon de- 
sign for zero-maintenance. Finally, Combining multiple fine- 
grained sensing and repair strategies for both manufacturing 
yield and through-life maintenance will lead to more efficient 
resource reuse. The associated design challenges are equally 
significant: i) justifying cost of resources and design com- 
plexity (including test and evaluation); ii) gaining confidence 
in new strategies; iii) overcoming barriers for certification in 
certain application areas; iv) understanding the options for 
integrating zero-maintenance at various design levels (and 
potentially cross-layered approaches). In most instances, there 
is a lack of EDA tool support for effective design exploration 
and evaluation. From the multitude of strategies considered,   
it seems clear that no single approach to zero-maintenance in 
electronics will win and that a multi-objective design approach 
is necessary 
Design for zero-maintenance incurs many competing design 
goals across several areas in electronics sub-systems. These 
systems are composed of many sub-systems that must operate 
error-free otherwise downtime leads to a direct loss of service 
high MRO costs. At the chip-level,  speed,  efficiency  and 
cost per unit area are paramount though test and verification 
complexity are becoming limiting factors. Board-level and 
higher levels bring in new factors including weight, absolute 
Application Faults Status Opportunities for zero-maintenance 
Civil and military 
aircraft; autonomous 
flight 
Radiation effects from 
ground to 60,000ft 
nMR; mutual-checking/voting systems; 
resilient sensors for test beds [146] 
Predictable recovery; assistive fault 
monitoring and discrimination 
Wind turbine and 
nuclear 
decommissioning; 
inspection; disaster 
assessment 
Heavy radiation; remote 
servicing/inspection; 
detection & monitoring for 
harsh environments 
Fault-detection and diagnosis [147]; 
robotic inspection [148]; 
Self-maintaining control systems; 
sustained operation; functional 
hardening [149] 
Exploration and orbital 
communications SEU/MBU mitigation 
systems 
Modularized electronics, interconnect 
[150]; resilient SoC [151], 
transceivers [152] & redundancy [66], for 
spacecraft altitude [153] 
Unmanned systems that self-maintain 
(e.g. Skylon); modular spares; 
sophisticated fault diagnosis [131] 
Dependability of 
safety-critical 
subsystems 
Vibration; temperature 
cycling; ground level SEU 
Reconfigurable MCM platforms; Secure 
Soc; electromechanical redundancy, for 
electric ship power systems [154] 
The self-healing vehicle [155]; 
mitigation for systemic failures; 
fail-save; rapid recovery 
On-board power and 
control systems; 
electrification 
 
Autonomous 
exploration; pipeline 
inspection 
Ageing; fault prevention 
and discrimination 
Power-on self-test routines for power 
systems. Guided repair [156] 
Enhanced fault logging & localization; 
maintaining predictable operation 
Extreme environment 
(drilling, mining, deep sea) 
Autonomous vehicles; extreme 
environment sensing and predictive failure 
monitoring [157] 
Prolonged unmanned operation with 
limited communications; fault logging 
collaborative systems 
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cost, integration density and accessibility for inspection. At 
the top design level, inter-modular issues are prevalent in- 
cluding cabling and connectors, density issues (e.g., thermal 
management) and efficiency of space usage (e.g., in compact 
avionics bay). Once again, the test and verification complexity 
is ever-increasing. Traditional approaches such as design for 
reliability, component screening and modular redundancy have 
been enlisted with mission critical systems but their cost is 
often viewed as being unjustifiable. New low-level capabilities 
promise to bring underlying fault detection and discrimination 
but these capabilities must be integrated. 
Where possible, zero-maintenance techniques should be 
tightly integrated with maintenance-related technologies. This 
is possible owing to the already mature hierarchical archi- 
tecture of microelectronics design, though perhaps less well- 
developed at the higher board, sub-module levels. The poten- 
tial impact brought about by zero-maintenance should not be 
underestimated, especially for industrial applications that are 
heavily penalised by downtime. At the same time, autonomous 
maintenance strategies may lead to difficulties in certification. 
For example, if the trustworthiness of a sub-component is 
dependent on knowing its exact configuration at any time, 
then self-configuring approaches may be challenging, and fault 
masking may be the only route. Information arising from fault 
registration, discrimination and localisation will provide new 
opportunities for assessing system status in terms of fault 
capacity, environmental harshness and onset of ageing. This 
could potentially revolutionise predictive and scheduled main- 
tenance as well as better-informing major MRO and major 
failure events as well as offering self-preservation capabilities 
when faults can be predicted. Fault localisation offers direct 
benefits for fault tracing in complex systems and to avoid no-
fault found scenarios. However, it is less obvious how zero-
maintenance strategies will directly solve this particular 
problem and they may instead reside alongside bespoke fault 
locating strategies. 
Active mitigation methods are undoubtedly closest to the 
vision of self-healing systems, but are still reliant upon effec- 
tive (re-)organisation of their internal resources. In this con- 
text, self-healing may not become autonomic (i.e., fully self- 
initiated) due to the need for fault registration and reporting of 
events where resources have been re-organised, re-generated 
or drawn down from external sources [22]. An example of a 
process that is part self-healing is seen in [158], in which        
a data storage device contains embedded heating elements 
able to restore neighbouring non-responsive storage cells. This 
has the effect of re-establishing the correct material response 
and so the recovery of degraded memory cells is accelerated. 
The precise relationships between self-maintenance and self- 
healing technologies have yet not been established. 
It could be argued that a better balance must be achieved 
between preventing faults from ever occurring in the first place 
and mitigation, e.g., super conducting quantum locked fields 
for space travel that may provide both simultaneous propul- 
sion and strong shielding against radiation particles for both 
passengers and electronic systems. Such developments could 
help readdress the balance between fault prevention/mitigation 
coupled hardware/software design. In the event of disruptive 
future technologies, one might still ask what would be the 
consequences of failures of  the  clever  idea  itself  i.e.,  in  
the above example resulting in loss of shielding? This still 
validates the wider arguments in this article even if there  
were a paradigm shift in hardware/software capabilities. 
Despite recent advancements, the building blocks of design 
for zero-maintenance need to be better understood. The tra- 
ditional paradigm of multi-level design is well-suited, but a 
holistic approach is needed to combine strategies potentially 
across multiple design levels. An evolution from tolerance 
towards active mitigation has been observed in electronics, 
due in part to  projected  capabilities  of  (and  manufactur-  
ing challenges associated with) nanoscale electronics. How- 
ever, although emerging strategies promise much for zero- 
maintenance capabilities within future electronic systems, their 
success is dependent upon a more precise and predictable 
evaluation of the associated resource overhead, performance 
impact and fault capacity metrics. The future of this field looks 
promising and equally pervasive to a host of applications and 
domains. We ourselves are looking towards development of 
practical demonstrations of whole systems that exhibit this 
philosophy of zero-maintenance, beyond just electronics but 
also mechanical and robotic systems, particularly within the 
manufacturing and through-life services industries, where we 
will likewise also outline our perspectives, challenges and 
opportunities. 
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